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STOP AND FRISK: A PERSPECTIVE
The fourth amendment protects a citizen's privacy from arbitrary
invasion by the police. Before the police may search or Seize a person
or his property, evidence of probable cause isually must be presented
to a magistrate in order to obtain the necessary warrant.1 A policeman
may make a lawful arrest without a warrant, however, if he has probable cause to believe that a felony has just been committed and the
individual he intends to arrest has committed it2 The policeman
making such an arrest may contemporaneously make a limited search
of the prisoner's person,3 the property under his control, 4 and the
place where he is arrested.
Several recent statutes and court decisions have given police the
authority to forcibly stop and frisk persons and detain them for investigation on grounds less than probable cause.6 Stop and frisk legislation is applicable in two distinct situations. The first is often referred
to as "preventive criminality." P, a patrolman, observes S, poorly
dressed and unshaven, leaning against a tree in an unlighted section
of the city park. As P approaches, S begins to walk rapidly in the other
direction. Although P does not have probable cause to arrest S, S's
demeanor and the accompanying circumstances arguably justify a
suspicion that he is about to engage in criminal activity. Proponents
of stop and frisk contend that P should be allowed to stop S, ask him
to explain his conduct, and, failing a satisfactory explanation, detain
7
him for further investigation and interrogation.
1 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-11 (1964); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 314
(1967) (dissenting opinion).
2 McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). See also Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25
IowA L. REv. 201, 228-33 (1963). Police authority to arrest a suspected misdemeanant
without a warrant varies among jurisdictions. See Remington, The Law Relating to "On
the Street" Detention, Questioning, and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest
Privileges in General, 51 J. Cvimr. L.C. & P.S. 386, 388-89 "1960).
3 McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
4 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
5 See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 US. 56 (19501; Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145 (1947); cf. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
6 See generally N.Y. C~i.
PROC. LAW § 180-a (Mckinney Supp. 1967); the proposed
Uniform Arrest Act §§ 2-3, in Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315, 344
(1942); Mov. CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §§ 2.01, 2.02 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966);
UN FoRm ARREsT Acr §§ 5-6 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1965) [hereinafter cited as UNIFOFM
Au
TsrAd-]. In a case that arose before, but was heard after, the effective date of the
New York statute, the Court of Appeals recognized police authority to stop and frisk
a "suspicious" person. People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458
(1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965). The California Supreme Court has upheld a
similar practice. People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. d 448, 380 P.2d 658, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963).
7 Wilson, Police Arrest Privileges in a Free Society: A Pled for Modernization, 51
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In the second situation the object is not to prevent crime, but to
allow the patrolman to conduct an "investigation" of a person he suspects has committed a crime. P observes S, unshaven and poorly attired, carrying a new and obviously expensive radio in an area where
a number of appliance warehouses are located. Law enforcement
officials again argue that P should have authority to stop and question
S and detain him should he fail to dispel the suspicion aroused.8
Stop and frisk legislation has its xoots in vagrancy and loitering
statutes and is subject to many of the same criticisms. Beyond any
technical constitutional objections lies a more important issuewhether stop and frisk is a necessary or even desirable law enforcement
tool. Does the cost to individual liberty outweigh the uncertain contribution to the preservation of law and order?
I
PREVENTIVE CRIMINALITY: VAGRANCY AND LOITERING STATUTES

To properly evaluate statutes permitting detention on suspicion
that the person is about to commit a crime, it is useful to review
similar legislative attempts to intercept the potential criminal-vagrancy and loitering statutes.
A.

Vagrancy Statutes

Vagrancy statutes punish status rather than conduct by making
illegal a pattern of behavior, not the commission of any single act.9
Generally these statutes define a vagrant in terms of the repeated occurrence of conduct that in isolated instances would be considered
harmless-for example, wandering.10 Historically, the justification for
punishing a pattern of otherwise innocuous behavior is based on two
J. CRim. L.C. & P.S. 895, 399 (1960). See also Younger, Stop and Frisk: "Say It Like It Is,"
58 J. CR
im. L.C. & P.S. 298, 299 (1967).
8 See Younger, supra note 7, at 293-94.
9 On the problems of status criminality in general, see Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest
on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1 (1960); Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration,
104 U. PA. L. REv. 603 (1960); Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition,
66 HAv. L. REV. 1203 (1953); Perkins, The Vagrancy Concept, 9 HAstiNGs L-.J. 237
(1958); Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of Revision, 48
CALIF. L. RV. 557 (1960).
10 This is not always the case. Modern vagrancy statutes often make a pattern of
criminal behavior the basis of a status crime, such as prostitution or habitual drunkenness. Note, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered: Problems and Abuses of Status Criminality, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rav, 102, 115.(1962)..
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propositions. First, the mode of life subject to sanction is thought to
be injurious to the individual's moral well-being." Punishment is
often applied simply to deter the idle wanderer from continuing to
travel the road to ruin. Second, the vagrant's behavior is thought to
evidence criminal inclinations that should be punished before they
mature into serious crimes.' 2 These two propositions continue to
serve as the rationale for modern vagrancy statutes; courts still assert
that a vagabond life fosters a tendency to commit crime13 and that
14
"[a] vagrant is a probable criminal.'
In Elizabethan England groups of idle wanderers, the notorious
brotherhoods of beggars, roamed the countryside engaging in criminal
activity. 15 Although it was probably true that a member of such a
brotherhood was a potential felon, his modern counterpart probably
is not.16 Many vagrants by personal choice prefer to travel about the
country living by odd jobs. Their needs are few and can usually be
supplied without resort to crime. 17 Many others who fall within the
ambit of the vagrancy statutes do not choose the vagabond life voluntarily. They are either mentally ill or suffering from the combination
of mental and physical deterioration that often accompanies old age.
Some, unable to deal with their environment, welcome arrest and
incarceration.' 8
1. Constitutional Objections
Vagrancy statutes impose sanctions on a particular status because
the legislature has decided that persons who adopt that status are likely
to commit crimes. In similar situations where a particular status, harmless in itself, has been made a crime, the Supreme Court has stated that
there must be a substantial likelihood that the assumption of the status
11

See id.at 105.

12 Id.

13 See District of Columbia v. Hunt, 163 F.2d 833, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Lucas v.
State, 31 Okla. Crim. 297, 238 P. 502 (1925).
14 District of Columbia v. Hunt, 163 F.2d 833, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
15 Note, supra note 10, at 105.
16 See Douglas, supra note 9; Foote, supra note 9, at 627.
17 Foote, supra note 9, at 627.
18 As the writer arrived in the morning, the guards were trying to get rid of an
inmate who had just been discharged but who was sitting on the sidewalk just
outside the entrance. Three hours later he was still sitting, this time 100 yards
further down the sidewalk. Two mornings later he was observed arriving in the
police van with a three month sentence as a vagrant.
A number of inmates appeared to be of this type, and some had as many
as seventy prior commitments to the House of Correction.
Id. at 636.
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will be attended by the activity the legislature desires to prohibit. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court in Scales v. United States,1 9 said:
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a status or on conduct can only be justified
by reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to other
concededly criminal activity . . . that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order
to withstand attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.20
In view of the tenuous relationship between the harmless conduct punished by the vagrancy statutes and "other concededly criminal
activity," it is possible that these laws do not satisfy the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment. Recently two state courts
have invalidated vagrancy statutes on just such grounds. In Reno v.
Second Judicial District Court,21 the Supreme Court of Nevada held
a statute unconstitutional that made criminal the consorting of two
persons of evil reputation. 22 In Fenster v. Leary,23 the New York Court
of Appeals struck down a vagrancy statute that made a criminal of a
person who, with no visible means of support, liives without employment. The court noted that the proscribed state of idleness was not in
itself harmful to the commonwealth and that this harmless conduct
24
had no substantial relation to future criminal activity.

Many vagrants do not voluntarily choose their "degenerate" way
of life; their behavior is the product of mental and physical deficiencies. Although their presence in public parks and on public streets
offends the sensibilities of many citizens, medical treatment seems more
appropriate than penal sanctions. In many urban areas, however, these
19 867 U.S. 203 (1961).
20 367 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1961). See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 519-21

(1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-73 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
21 83 Nev.-,
427 P.2d 4 (1967).
22 The enactment does not demand the doing of an act or the presence of criminal intent in order to punish for disobedience. These requisites are sought to
be supplied by inference from the mere fact that the defendant has an evil
reputation and is found consorting with another who bears the same burden....
. . One possessing an evil reputation may be arrested, booked, [and] arraigned... all because of the officer's subjective, on the spot evaluation, aided,
of course, by the presumption that the defendant had some unlawful purpose
in mind. In our judgment the interests of a free society are not promoted by
such an ordinance.
Id. at
427 P.2d at 7-8. See also Parker v. Municipal Judge, 83 Nev.
, 427 P.2d
642 (1967) (disorderly persons).
23 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967).
24 Id. at 312-13, 229 N.E.2d at 429-30, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
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unfortunates constitute a considerable proportion of those arrested on
25
vagrancy charges.
Driver v. Hinnat26 suggests the possibility that punishing these
unfortunates as criminals may violate the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. The Fourth Circuit held that any punishment of a
chronic alcoholic for public drunkenness was cruel and unusual,
noting that "[t]he alcoholic's presence in public is not his act, for he
did not will it. ' 2 The same might well be said of the aged and infirm
vagrant. His vagabond life is the result of his psychological and physiological infirmities. Although no court has held mental or physical inadequacy a defense to a charge of vagrancy, the court in Fenster v.
Leary indicated that its decision to strike down a vagrancy statute on
due process grounds was influenced by considerations of the inequity
28
of punishing involuntary vagrants.

2. PracticalProblems
Besides its constitutional difficulties, status criminality also presents problems in practical application. American courts have interpreted vagrancy statutes as prohibiting a pattern of conduct, not a
single act. 29 As a result, the statutes have only limited value as a means
of preventing crime; the policeman cannot theoretically arrest as a
vagrant a person he suspects is about to commit a crime, unless he is
aware of that person's habitual mode of being.3 0 In urban areas it is
9, at 633-34.
26 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966). See also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962);
Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
27 356 F.2d at 764.
28 20 N.Y.2d at 314, 229 N.E.2d at 429, g82 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
29 "[T]he idleness and wandering about described in our vagrancy statute is aimed
at a mode of life, and certainly not at one isolated instance of idleness of only a few
hours duration at most." Brooks v. State, 33 Ala. App. 390, 392, 34 So. 2d 175, 177 (1948).
[S]uch persons are denominated vagrants because their course of conduct . . .
is habitual in its nature.. .. In order to prove that a person is a drunkard,
or common drunkard, so as to be punished as a vagrant, it would be necessary
to show that drunkenness was his course of conduct, or condition of being, or
status, in a continuous, or at least habitual, way.
Parshall v. State, 62 Tex. Crim. 177, 192, 138 S.W. 759, 766 (1911). See also Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 179 Mass. 533, 534, 61 N.E. 213, 214 (1901). Compare State v. Grenz,
26 Wash. 2d 764, 175 P.2d 633 (1946), appeal dismissed, 332 U.S. 748 (1947).
30 As a practical matter the theory of vagrancy statutes is ignored:
No cases were observed in this study in which the police gave any indication
of trying to get evidence on a defendant's mode of life and making an arrest only
after they had observed a sufficient series of acts to add up to the prohibited
status. Vagrancy is of use to the police in Philadelphia today as a weapon against
suspicious persons only because the law is so loosely and illegally administered
that an isolated act is all that is required for conviction. The magistrates were
25 See Foote, supra note
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exceedingly difficult to gain this awareness. Furthermore, the categories
of conduct that define a vagrant, although broad enough to cover
many situations, are often inapplicable in situations where the modern
police officer must act. For example, many statutes define a vagrant
in terms of nightwalking or wandering at late and unusual hours.
The modern criminal's activity, however, does not take place solely
at night. 31
B. Loitering Statutes

Although the vagrancy laws were recognized as "archaic in concept, quaint in phraseology, a symbol of injustice to many and very
largely at variance with prevailing standards of constitutionality," they
were thought to "serve a necessary purpose and remain as essential
means by which law enforcement agencies discharge their primary
function of preserving law and order and preventing the commission
of crime."3 2 The proposed solution to this dilemma was the loitering
statute, which was intended to "make it possible for police departments
to discharge their responsibilities in a straightforward manner without
...evasions and hypocrisies ....- 33
Loitering statutes usually contain several definitions of the crime.
For our purposes, however, discussion can be limited to those provisions that, like the "suspicious-loitering" provision of a late draft of
the Model Penal Code, place an obligation upon "[a] person who loiters
or wanders . .. under circumstances which justify suspicion that he
may be . .. about to engage in crime" to identify himself and give

a reasonable explanation of his behavior.3 4 Although these statutes
apparently unaware of the proof necessary to establish the status elements which
are essential ingredients of the offense; in any event, they never applied them.
Foote, supra note 9, at 630.
31 Warner, supra note 6, at 321.
32 Sherry, supra note 9, at 566. The author of this article was the draftsman of CAL.
PEN. CODE.§ 647 (West Supp. 1967), which replaced the California vagrancy law. For a
similar judicial evaluation of vagrancy statutes, see Parker v. Municipal Judge, 83 Nev.
- ,427 P.2d 642, 645-46 (dissenting opinion) (salutory object: prevention of
crime).
33 Sherry, supra note 9, at b67.
34 MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.12 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961). Compare the wording of
the California and New York loitering statutes with the two drafts of the Model Code
provision. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 240.35(6) (McKinney 1967) provides that one is guilty of
loitering if he:
loiters, remains-or wanders in or about a place without apparent reason and
under circumstances which justify suspicion that he may be engaged or about
to engage in crime, and, .upon inquiry by a peace officer, refuses to identify himself or fails to give a reasonably credible account of his conduct and purposes ....
(Emphasis added).
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eliminate the quaint phraseology of the vagrancy. statutes, they retain
the vagrancy concept-the punishment: of a person on suspicion of
criminal potential. The Model Code draft's "suspicious-loitering"
section made the suspicious situation only the basis for police inquiries
to which the actor must respond rather than an offense in itself.35
Creating a duty to respond to police inquiries may, however, be invalid as an infringement of the suspect's privilege against self-incrimination. 36 Recognition of this problem may have influenced the draftsCAL. PEN. CODE § 647(e) (West Supp. 1967) is similar in that it makes both the conduct
and the failure to respond elements of the offense, but the conduct is described as
"wander[ing] upon the streets or from place to place without apparent reason or business." A late MODEL PENAL CODE draft (§ 250.12 of Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961) made the
gravamen of the offense the failure to respond: a person "commits a violation if he
refuses the request of a peace officer that he identify himself and give a reasonably credible
account of the lawfulness of his conduct and purposes." But MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6
(Official Draft 1962) makes behavior the essence of the offense:
A person commits a violation if he loiters or prowls in a place, at a time, or
in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals under circumstances that
warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity.
The draftsmen explained the change to justifiable alarm as a means of saving the section "from attack and possible invalidation as a subterfuge by which the police would
be empowered to arrest and search without probable cause." MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment at 227 (Official Draft 1962). But see Schwartz, The Model Penal Code: An Invitation to Law Reform, 49 A.B.A.J. 447, 455 (1963):
[B]y preserving the right of police action in these situations, real criminality
may be exposed. The policeman who arrests the illegal loiterer may search the
person arrested and find stolen goods or illegal weapons, or the arrested person
may turn out to be a wanted felon.
35 See note 34 supra. The draftsmen inserted the section as the "least objectionable"
method for "jurisdictions unwilling to break entirely from the vagrancy concept." MODEL
PENAL CODE, Comment at 65 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961).
36 MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment at 60 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961). At common law
the citizen had no duty to respond to the policeman, and the policeman had no formal
means of compelling an answer. Hence, the privilege as such did not apply to police
interrogations.
Since police have no legal right to compel answers, there is no legal obligation to which a privilege in the technical sense can apply. That is, it makes
no sense to say that one is privileged not to disclose-that one is excused from
the legal consequences of contumacy--when there are no legal consequences of
contumacy.
8 J. WwmoRE, EvDENCE § 2252, at 329 n-27 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton 1961). Confessions
coerced by state police were dealt with under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). But one Supreme Court case had
suggested that in federal courts, such confessions were dealt with under the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 582, 542 (1897).
Thus, when Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1965), applied the full scope of the federal
privilege against self-incrimination to the states, the privilege may have been extended
to state police interrogations. That the privilege does apply in this context was made
clear by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966). Thus, penal sanctions for failure to
explain one's conduct are probably unconstitutional as a penalty making the assertion
of the privilege costly. See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey,
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men to change the final version to make the "suspicious behavior,"
and not the failure to respond, the gravamen of the offense.
II.
STOP AND FRISK

Statutory grants of authority to stop and frisk are, on the whole,
very similar. The most important are the New York Stop and Frisk
Law,37 the Uniform Arrest Act,38 and the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure. 39 All three authorize the police to stop and question
a person whose behavior gives rise to a justifiable suspicion that he
has committed or is about to commit a crime4° and to frisk those individuals they reasonably believe to be dangerous. 41 The provisions
385 U.S. 493 (1967); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1 (1965). Any argument to the contrary based upon the exculpatory nature of the required statements seems to be undermined by the recognition in Miranda that exculpatory statements are often as likely to incriminate as inculpatory statements. Similarly,
any statements made under the pressure of penal sanctions are probably inadmissible
because involuntary. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
37 N.Y. Csms. Paoc. LAW § 180-a (McKinney Supp. 1967).
38 Warner, supra note 6, at 344; see also UNIFORM ARREST Ac, §§ 5-6.
39 MODEL CODE OF PE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE

§§

2.01-.02 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).

40 The Model Code provides that a policeman may stop a person if that person "is
observed in circumstances which suggest that he has committed or is about to commit a
felony or misdemeanor .... " Id. § 2.02(2). N.Y. CRI. PROC. LAw § 180-a (McKinney Supp.
1967) allows a policeman to stop a person "whom he reasonably suspects is committing,
has committed or is about to commit a felony .... " Section 2 of the Warner's Uniform
Arrest Act (see Warner, supra note 6, at 344) provides that "[a] peace officer may stop any
person abroad who he has reasonable ground to suspect is committing, has committed
or is about to commit a crime... ." Statutes modeled on the Warner's Uniform Arrest
Act have been passed in three states: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 1902 (1953); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 594:2 (1955) (four-hour detention); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 12-7-1 (1956). The Delaware Supreme Court has interpreted its statute to require probable cause for a detention.
De Salvatore v. State, 52 Del. 550, 163 A.2d 244 (1960). For comment on this case see Foote,
The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest?, 51 J. CRus. L.C. &:
P.S. 402, 403 (1960); Note, The Law of Arrest: Constitutionalityof Detention and Frisk Acts,
59 Nw. U.L. R~v. 641, 647 (1964). The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in the face of an
express two-hour limitation, has held that there is no such limitation and that the intent
of the statute includes detention for a reasonable time. State v. Kilday, 90 R.I., 91, 155
A.2d 336 (1959).
41 The standard suggested by the Model Code is reasonable belief "that [the policeman's] safety so requires." MODEL CODE OF PRE-APRAiGNMENT PROCEDURE

§

2.02(5) (Tent.

Draft No. 1, 1966). The New York stop and frisk law requires the policeman's reasonable
suspicion "that he is in danger of life or limb." N.Y. Cius. PROc. LAw § 180-a (McKinney Supp. 1967). Section 3 of the Warner's Uniform Arrest Act (see Warner, supra note 6,
at 344) permits a frisk by a policeman who has "reasonable ground to believe that he is in
danger if the person possesses a dangerous weapon."
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differ principally in the length of time for which the police are permitted to detain a suspicious person who has either refused to respond
to questions or has given unsatisfactory answers. Both the- Uniform
Act and the Model Code authorize detention for a fixed period. The
Uniform Act permits a two-hour restraint without limitation on the
place of confinement. The Model Code allows the officer to detain a
suspect for up to twenty minutes in the vicinity of the suspect's apprehension. Although on its face the New York statute has no such
provision, the courts have interpreted it to permit a reasonable period
42
of detention.
A. The ConstitutionalProblem-The Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment is the principal constitutional hurdle
which stop and frisk legislation must face. If the necessary detention
authorized by such legislation is considered an "arrest" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment, any such police activity without
probable cause will be unconstitutional unless the courts are prepared
43
to redefine probable cause.
1. The Detention
In tort law, the term "arrest" is used to refer to any interference
with the liberty of a person, no matter how slight.44 This definition

has been applied in criminal law as well. 45 Proponents of the stop and
frisk laws, however, reject the assertion that for purposes of the criminal law any infringement on an individual's freedom must be considered an arrest. When a policeman makes a formal arrest, he intends
to initiate a process that ultimately results in a criminal trial. The
person arrested is booked, fingerprinted, indicted, and if he cannot
42 United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (not unreasonable in
length and search still investigatory rather than accusatory).
43 For a case in which the Court has changed traditional notions of probable cause,

see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), wherein the test of probable cause
to obtain a health inspection warrant was made a function not of the qualities of the
suspect but rather of the legitimacy of the inspector's undertaking.
44 "If the plaintiff submits, or if there is even a momentary taking into the custody
of the law, there is an arrest .... W. PRossER, ToRTs § 12, at 58 (3d ed. 1964) (footnotes
omitted).
45 United States v. Mitchell, 179 F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1959) (accompaniment to call
box one block away); United States v. Scott, 149 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1957) (restrained
of full liberty). It has been suggested that the conflict with the fourth amendment could
be avoided if the Supreme Court held that the informal detention is not a "seizure,"
and thus could have a separate legal existence on grounds less formal than probable
cause. Comment, Police Power to Stop, Frisk, and Question Suspicious Persons, 65

COLUm. L. Rlv. 848, 858 (1965).
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provide bail, incarcerated to await trial. 'Since this is such a serious
restriction of individual liberty, it is unreasonable to subject an individual to it on grounds less than probable cause. It is argued that
a brief detention, on the other hand, is not as serious a restriction
as an arrest.46 Moreover, the individual is not subjected to fingerprint47
ing nor must he suffer the stigma of a recorded arrest.
The Supreme Court may have already decided that the standard
of probable cause applies to any forcible detention regardless of duration. In Henry v. United States, 48 the Court reversed a conviction
imposed after the denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained
by federal agents after they had stopped a car without probable cause
to arrest the occupants. Proponents of the stop and frisk laws have
distinguished the case on two grounds. First, because of the particular
circumstances-the government had conceded that an arrest had taken
place the moment the officers had stopped the defendant's car-the
49
court never reached the question of what constitutes an arrest.

Second, the case dealt only with the concept of arrest in federal procedural law, and the holding did not establish a constitutional mandate
binding upon the states.0° Thus, it may still be uncertain whether a
46 See United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771, 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States
v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 77-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 446,
201 N.E.2d 32, 35, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 463 (1964).
47 United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771, 794 (SMD.N.Y. 1966). The court further
points out that detention of an innocent person for a short time would be welcomed as
an opportunity to display his innocence quickly. Id.
48 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
49 See United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States
v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Younger, supra note 7, at 293. But see
Souris, Stop and Frisk or Arrest and Search-The Use and Misuse of Euphemisms, 57
J. CRr. L.C. & P.S. 251 (1966).
In opposition to this argument is the language of the majority opinion: "The prosecution conceded below, and adheres to the concession here, that the arrest took place when
the federal agents stopped the car. That is our view on the facts of this particular case."
361 U.S. at 103 (footnote omitted). The dissent also took that view: "The Court seems to
say that the mere stopping of the car amounted to an arrest of the petitioner. I cannot
agree." Id. at 106.
50 See People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 380 P.2d 658, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963). The
Supreme Court has indicated that the state may deviate from the federal procedural
norm and yet remain within the constitutional standard of reasonableness.
[A]lthough the standard of reasonableness is the same under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the demands of our federal system compel us to distinguish between evidence held inadmissible because of our supervisory powers
over federal courts and that held inadmissible because prohibited by the United
States Constitution. . . . The States are not thereby precluded from developing
workable rules governing arrests, searches and seizures to meet "the practical
demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement" in the States,
provided that those rules do not violate the constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures . ...
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state can constitutionally authorize its police to stop and detain persons on grounds less than probable cause. 51
2. The Frisk
Assuming a policeman is given the authority to stop suspicious
persons, many insist that, for his own protection, he must also have
authority to search for weapons.5 2 To support this exception to the
general rule that police must obtain a warrant before they search,
proponents of the "frisk" point to an analogous exception, the authority to search incident to a lawful arrest.53 In both cases the justification for the search is the protection of the policeman, who is
lawfully detaining a suspected criminal. Furthermore, they assert
that the frisk is a less serious invasion of the individual's privacy than
a search, and is reasonable even in the absence of probable cause.5 4
3. Are the Frisk and Detention Lesser Infringements?
The similarity between a detention and an arrest depends upon
a number of factors, such as the location, duration, and incidents of
the custody.55 All three stop and frisk statutes under consideration
here eliminate disagreeable incidents of arrest such as fingerprinting
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33-34 (1963). In a case involving evidence seized by state
policemen but used in a federal trial, the Court was again faced with the problem of
defining arrest. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960). The Court avoided a decision

on the issue by remanding for evaluation of conflicting testimony on the question of the
officers' intent.
51 The Court's language in Henry may, however, tilt the balance toward disallowing
stop and frisk: "Under our system suspicion is not enough for an officer to lay hands
on a citizen." 361 U.S. at 104 (dictum) (emphasis added).
52 See Remington, supra note 2, at 390. See also Wilson, supra note 7, at 399. Warner
suggests that in one sense the question of whether to grant the police authority to frisk
is academic. Police officers will continue to "'frisk' suspects whether or not such action
is legal." Warner, supra note 6, at 325. The real question is whether the weapons which
the police discover in the course of the frisk should be admissible as evidence. This
militates toward allowing the frisk, since disallowing it will insure no benefit to the
innocent while allowing the guilty to go free.
53 See notes 3-5 supra.
54 See People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219 N.E2d 196, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1966);
People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964).
55 The extension of the privilege against self-incrimination to include police inter-

rogation, see note 36 supra, and the development of procedural rules to insure its free
exercise, raise the possibility that even when the suspect is lawfully in custody, his incriminating statements might be inadmissible if they were made before he was properly
warned of his constitutional rights and offered an opportunity to consult with counsel.
The so-called Miranda warnings need only be given, however, in those situations which
qualify as "custodial interrogations." For a discussion of the scope of "custodial interrogation" under Miranda, see Graham, What is "Custodial Interrogation"?: California's
Anticipatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 59 (1967).
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and booking. The inconvenience of being taken into custody remains,
but the innocent individual avoids the onus of an arrest record. The
statutes differ as to the duration of the detention and its permissible
location. The Uniform Act and the New York law, as interpreted,
provide for rather lengthy detention and permit removal of the suspect from the place of apprehension. The detention they authorize
thus seems very close to an arrest. On the other hand, the Model Code
permits only a twenty minute on-the-spot detention.
Exactly what constitutes "frisking" for a weapon is not clear. The
New York Court of Appeals has defined the procedure as passing one's
hands over the suspect's outer clothing,56 but has also approved the
actions of a patrolman who searched a closed briefcase during a frisk., 7
The confusion over the scope of the permitted search has made possible the expansion of a frisk for weapons into a full-scale search on
mere suspicion of criminal activity. Although the language of the
statute usually limits the policeman's right to frisk to situations in
which he reasonably believes himself to be in danger, the standard
is often difficult to administer. As a result, courts have not generally
held police to a very strict standard.
Police have taken advantage of this situation to make use of the
frisk in circumstances where the discovery of contraband rather than
safety was the motivating factor. 58 In fact, there is some indication
that the desire to give the police a means of seizing evidence supplied an important part of the impetus for enacting the New York
law. Newspaper articles appeared while the bill was before the legislature emphasizing that
The measure would make it easier for the police to search
for and seize narcotics, burglar's tools, pistols, knives and other
illegal material ....
56 People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964).
57 People v. Pugach, 15 N.Y.2d 65, 204 NE.2d 176, 255 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 936 (1966).
58 People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219 N.E.2d 196, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1966), probable
jurisdiction noted, 389 U.S. 950 (1967); People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 219 N.E.2d 595,
273 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1966), probable jurisdiction noted, 389 U.S. 950 (1967).
Section 3 of the Warner's Uniform Arrest Act see Warner, supra note 6, at 344 talks
only in terms of weapons and does not indicate whether other evidence found in the course
of a frisk would be admissible. Section 2.02(5) of the MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PRocDuar (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966) defines the scope of the frisk in terms of "the extent
necessary to discover any dangerous weapons," but does not indicate whether contraband
discovered by a frisk within these bounds could legally be seized. The New York law
expressly authorizes seizure of "a weapon or any other thing the possession of which
may constitute a crime .... " N.Y. CIM. PROC. LAW § 180-a (McKinney Supp. 1967).
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The so-called "Stop-and-Frisk" bill would permit the police
to search persons under suspicion and to seize the evidence. 59
B. Is the Power to Stop, Question, and Detain Necessary?
Much like its predecessors-vagrancy and loitering-the stop and
frisk statute presents constitutional and practical difficulties. Proponents of the stop and frisk laws insist, however, that such authority
is necessary if the police are to function effectively. A proper analysis
of this claim requires a separate consideration of the demands of the
two situations in which this authority is used.
1. Preventive Criminality
Few would take exception to the proposition that it is better
to prevent a crime from occurring than to apprehend the criminal
after the fact. This is especially true with respect to crimes of vio-

lence to the person; the victim of a mugging receives little direct
benefit from the arrest of his assailant. Thus, it is understandable

that the current rise in criminal activity, and particularly the increase in crimes involving bodily injury, should produce an increased
emphasis on crime prevention.60
Prevention, within the area of the criminal law, is greatly undeveloped. The doctrine is widely practiced and constantly undergoing development in business and medicine, but unfortunately
not within the law. . . . It is important, if constitutionally permissible, to sanction a statute whereby crime can be prevented. 61
Proponents of the vagrancy laws or their more modem substi59 N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1964, at 41, col. 3.
60 Proponents of stop and frisk laws stress the danger of physical injury.
It is better to have an alert police force that prevents the crime than one that
devotes its time to seeking to identify the assailant after the life has been taken,
the daughter ravished, or the pedestrian slugged and robbed.
Wilson, supra note 7, at 398.

Children are entitled to the law's protection against idlers, loafers, and vagrants
who lurk about the schoolhouse and public toilets. May police not question an
elderly man who wanders through a public park offering children candy and
urging them to come visit him?
Younger, supra note 7, at 299. Such emphasis is misleading:
[A]bout 70 percent of all willful killings, nearly two-thirds of all aggravated
assaults and a high percentage of forcible rapes are committed by family members, friends, or other persons previously known to their victims.
[T£he risk of serious attack from spouses, family members, friends, or ac...
quaintances is almost twice as great as it is from strangers on the street.
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusTIcE,

OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, 18-19 (1967) [hereinafter
61 Parker v. Municipal Judge, 83 Nev.

ing opinion).

cited as
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CHALLNGE

PRESIDENT's CO IM'N].

427 P.2d 642, 645 (1967) (dissent-
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tutes, the loitering statutes and the stop and frisk laws, often stress
the importance of the role the police play in preventing crime, and
suggest that proper performance of this function requires authority
to forcibly detain individuals suspected of immediate criminal potential.62 Although it is clear that the presence of a patrolman in the
vicinity very often prevents crime, 63 this suggests enlarging the police
force rather than increasing the power of the present force. 64 If the
mere appearance of a policeman on the scene will result in the abortion of any criminal plans the suspect might harbor, why is the power
to apprehend him necessary?65
There is little doubt that the authority to detain and frisk provided by the stop and frisk laws or the authority to arrest provided
by the loitering statutes is valuable to the police. Such authority permits the police to investigate possible past criminal activity and to
ascertain whether the suspect is in possession of weapons or contraband. Neither of these activities is, however, directly related to the
prevention of crime. Preventive criminality is actually a misleading
title for the doctrine that suspicion of future criminal activity justifies an invasion of privacy to search for evidence of past or present
criminal activity.
Proponents of preventive criminality stress the danger of permitting "suspicious" persons to wander and loiter in public places, but
in the interest of preserving the freedom of the individual, society
66
must run the risk of antisocial behavior.
Moreover, the benefits resulting from detention and frisking of
suspicious persons might well be outweighed by an increase in tension
between police and citizens, especially members of minority groups.
62 The "basic purpose [of the police] is to remove or lessen by both physical and
psychological means the opportunity to commit crimes." Wilson, supra note 7, at 398.
63 PRESmE.NT'S CoMM'N, supra note 60, at 95.
64- One commentator has suggested that the stop and frisk laws represent an attempt
by the legislature to appear to take strong measures against increasing criminal activity
without any extra expenditures. Foote, supra note 40, at 405-06. But there is some question as to how far a police force can be expanded. "Presumably, deterrence would best be
served by placing a policeman on every corner. . . . But few Americans would tolerate
living under police scrutiny that intense, and in any case few cities could afford to provide it." PR.SmENT's COMM~t'N, supra note 60, at 95.
65 Even proponents of stop and frisk laws agree that the policeman's presence alone
is usually enough to prevent the crime. See Wilson, supra note 7, at 898.
06 Those with the right of free movement use it at times for mischievous purposes. But that is true of many liberties we enjoy. We nevertheless place our
faith in them, and against restraint, knowing that the risk of abusing liberty
so as to give rise to punishable conduct is part of the price we pay for this free
society.
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 520 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Even though properly enforced, the law will be applied primarily to
members of minority groups whose habits, dress, or environment will
no doubt make them appear more suspicious to the patrolman.6 7 Such
an anticipation formed the basis of the objection of a number of Negro assemblymen to the New York law, which they charged would
subject "the people of their districts to 'even greater abuse than they
now suffer at the hands of police.' "68
2. Apprehending Criminals
Granting authority to apprehend persons suspected of having
committed a crime presents a problem distinct from that of granting
authority to detain and search persons suspected of being about to
commit a crime. The pressure to permit the police to apprehend
individuals on grounds less than probable cause has developed in
response to the demands of modem law enforcement. It may very
well be true that, given the prevailing state of investigatory techniques, the power to stop and detain is vital to the solution of many
crimes. Indeed, the evidence gathered by the members of the President's Commission on Crime indicates that the police are not exaggerating when they insist that, if the suspicious person has actually
committed a crime, permitting him to walk away from the policeman
is tantamount to permitting him to walk away from punishment.
The effectiveness of police investigation when no suspect is identified
is very low. In the case of crimes against property such as burglary
and larceny in which identification of a suspect is rare, seventy-eight
percent of the reported serious crimes in one sample were never
solved.69
Nor is there much hope that improved methods of investigation
will decrease this percentage in the near future. Although one hears
much about scientific crime detection, in reality police technology is
70
lagging
Furthermore, even if more modern techniques were available,
there would still be a shortage of personnel trained in their use. Indeed, there is a shortage of personnel trained to make effective use
71
of the present limited scientific tools.
67 Souris, supra note 49, at 256.

68 N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1964, at 41, col. 3.
69 ParsIENT'S COMm'N, supra note 60, at 97.
70 "Sdentific crime detection... at present is a limited tool." Id.
71 [T]here is a shortage of policemen who are skilled in the collection, analysis
and preservation of evidence. Only the biggest and best-run departments
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The rise in the crime rate combined with the inefficiency of our
methods of investigation has placed pressure on the police to apprehend individuals whom they suspect have committed crimes. As a
consequence of this pressure, the police are apt to detain individuals
under circumstances that are not sufficient to satisfy the standard
of probable cause. Proponents of the stop and frisk laws contend that
unless the police are allowed to detain on grounds less than probable
cause, courts reluctant to release guilty men will begin to dilute that
standard.
If the police seek to justify their actions as an arrest based
on probable cause, the dangers are great. For if the concept of
probable cause is expanded to cover these necessary though ambiguous cases, the effect will be to widen the power of the police
to visit upon persons the consequences of arrest when such should
not be done -2
Although this analysis is probably correct, it is not clear that it supports the authorization of a stop and frisk. Preserving probable cause
as the standard for an arrest is not particularly important if the detention permitted on the basis of a lesser standard is an equally severe
invasion of the suspect's right of privacy. Although some statutes authorize only a very brief detention limited to the immediate vicinity
of the suspect's apprehension, supporters of stop and frisk laws generally agree that a longer detention is necessary to afford the police
an adequate opportunity to investigate and confirm or rebut their
suspicions.7 3
To permit the police to detain suspects only for a period so short
that the purpose of the detention is thwarted does not seem sensible.
On the other hand, to permit an extended period of detention, which,
from the standpoint of the liberty and privacy of the subject is indistinguishable from an arrest is, in effect, to permit the legislature
to reduce the standard of probable cause.7 4
If the choice, then, is between permitting the legislature to promulgate what in effect is a new standard to govern search and seizure
or accepting the possibility that some courts, in an attempt to prehave personnel with sufficient technical training to search a crime scene effectively and have laboratory facilities to make use of the fruits of such searches.
Id.
72

United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771, 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).

73 Younger, supra note 7, at 293 n.l.

74 See pp. 909-11 supra. Although the person stopped under these circumstances
avoids the burden of a recorded arrest and may, therefore, prefer the stop, this does not
justify reducing the standard of probable cause, but, rather, suggests a reevaluation of
the policy of making public the record of arrest.
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serve the admissibility of seized evidence, will strain to find probable
cause in situations where its existence is questionable, the latter s eems
preferable. Retaining the present standard of probable cause will limit
the "extention" of police power to those situations in which probable
cause arguably exists, whereas a new standard of "reasonable suspicion" would expand police authority to cover a multitude of new
situations. Moreover, forcing the police to conform to the present
standard will encourage improvement in methods of investigation,
the only real solution to the problem.
John J. Duffy, Jr.

